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DANIELLE LYNN LORDI*
Police Liability Under State Tort
Law for Failure to Enforce
Protection Orders:  The Last
Demand for Accountability
[T]he plainest possible meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment mandate . . . is that no state may deny to any citizen the
protection of its criminal and civil law against private violence
and private violation.  Put differently, no state may, through
denials of protection, permit any citizen to live in a state of
“dual sovereignty.”. . . No citizen shall be subject to uncheck-
able violence by anyone other than the state; no citizen shall
be under the will and command of anyone other than the
state.1
When a police department fails to enforce a valid order ofprotection against domestic violence, the state subjects
the possessor of that protection order to a system of “dual sover-
eignty”:  the victim of domestic abuse is at once under the will
and command of both the state and the batterer.  According to
Robin West and other advocates for battered women who have
argued that systematic maladministration of the laws against do-
mestic violence constitutes a violation of equal protection, the
state’s failure to protect requires an enforceable remedy.2  With-
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Oregon Law Review , 2006-07.  I would like to thank Professor Caroline Forell for
her guidance and enthusiasm.  Thanks also to Professors Garrett Epps and Robert
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and friendship.  Finally, thanks to Professor Merle Weiner, my mentor, for her coun-
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1 Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment ,
94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 129 (1991).
2 E.g. , Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18-30,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032805;
West, supra  note 1, at 135. R
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out such a remedy, the state’s inaction reduces protection orders
to little more than dangerously deceptive pieces of paper.
The claim that police failure to enforce protection orders vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause3 has never reached the U.S.
Supreme Court.  However, the response at the lower federal
court level indicates that the problems of proof in establishing
the discriminatory intent required to prove this claim are proba-
bly insurmountable.4  As for other constitutional claims, in May
of 2005, a majority of the Court dashed the last remaining hope
for domestic violence victims seeking recognition of a due pro-
cess5 right to enforcement of their protection orders.  In Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Court ruled that Jessica Gonzales
did not have a property interest under the procedural aspect of
the Due Process Clause in having the police enforce the re-
straining order she had secured against her estranged husband.6
Sixteen years earlier, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services , the Court eliminated any possible sub-
stantive due process argument along these lines when it held that
the Due Process Clause does not require a state to protect its
citizens against the private violence of third parties.7
In accordance with the historical view that domestic violence is
a private matter beyond the scope of criminal law, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has adamantly refused to recognize any constitu-
tional right to the enforcement of protection orders, even where
this enforcement is seemingly mandatory under state statute.8
Justice Scalia, writing for the Castle Rock  majority, noted that
“[i]n light of today’s decision and that in DeShaney , the benefit
that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested
3 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “no state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 See  Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988)
(articulating the plaintiff’s burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination under the Equal Protection Clause when a police department’s administra-
tion of the laws turns on domestic violence versus nondomestic violence
classifications).
5 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “no state
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).
7 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
8 See, e.g. , Castle Rock , 125 S. Ct. at 2801 (referencing the language at issue in the
notice to law enforcement officials printed on the back of respondent’s restraining
order).
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for a crime generally does not trigger [constitutional] protections
. . . [reflecting] our continuing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth
Amendment as a ‘font of tort law.’”9
As a result, civil liability under state tort law is the last possible
basis for accountability.  Victims must be able to seek civil dam-
ages against state police departments that fail to enforce their
orders of protection.  Without a meaningful threat of tort liability
for failure to enforce, protection orders do little more than pay
lip service to the safety of the victims that they are supposed to
protect.
Part I of this Comment will describe the history and purpose of
domestic violence protection order statutes, both nationally and
in Oregon.  It will analyze victims’ use and the efficacy of these
orders to demonstrate their value in protecting individual vic-
tims’ safety and combating the domestic violence epidemic.
Part II will describe the failure of claims that a state’s refusal
to protect an individual from the violence of third parties violates
due process.  It will also examine the doomed equal protection
argument that failure to enforce protection orders constitutes sex
discrimination.
Part III will examine civil liability under state tort law systems,
which is the last viable route that domestic violence victims may
take to hold authorities accountable for failure to enforce protec-
tion orders.  It will also assess Oregon tort law as it applies to the
civil liability of local police agencies that fail to enforce Family
Abuse Prevention Act restraining orders.
Part IV will argue for national adoption of the Oregon ap-
proach of abolishing the public duty doctrine and imposing a
statutory duty to enforce.  It will also advocate codification of an
explicit cause of action within protection order statutory schemes
in every state, which will allow domestic violence victims to sue
police departments for failure to enforce. Together, these meth-
ods create a strong basis for liability and thus encourage the en-
forcement of domestic violence protection orders.
9 Id.  at 2810.
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I
CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Historical Overview
A battered woman faces unique obstacles in securing state
protection against domestic violence, including historic tolerance
of this behavior and sporadic enforcement of the laws against
it.10  The context in which the law enforcement response to do-
mestic violence developed reveals archaic notions about violence
against women committed by intimate partners—notions that
have greatly affected the state of modern domestic violence law.
This nation’s treatment of domestic violence has evolved from
legal approval in times of coverture, to tolerance in the interest
of so-called marital privacy, to an independent grassroots victim-
assistance movement, to, finally, state condemnation and accom-
panying legislative action.11  A major shift has occurred in the
past twenty-five years in response to the efforts of the women’s
movement of the 1960s and 1970s to make domestic violence an
issue of public concern.12  Even so, many obsolescent attitudes
about domestic violence persist, which makes law enforcement
accountability vitally important to both the safety of domestic vi-
olence victims and the equality of women.
The common law doctrine of coverture, by which women
ceased to exist legally upon marriage, persisted from the time of
America’s founding through the late nineteenth century.13  Cov-
erture made a man liable for the actions of his wife.14  Corre-
spondingly, a man had the right of chastisement, which permitted
him to subject his wife to beatings when she was disobedient.15
Although some states had criminalized wife beating by the late
10 See, e.g. , Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State:  The Struggle for the
Future of Domestic Violence Policy , 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1661-65. See also
Kapila Juthani, Note, Police Treatment of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse:  Af-
firmative Duty to Protect vs. Fourth Amendment Privacy , 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 51, 53-56 (2003) (exploring the historical police response to domestic vio-
lence and sexual assault and the persistence of privacy notions regarding domestic
violence).
11 Sack, supra  note 10, at 1666. R
12 Id.
13 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 13
(2000).
14 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy ,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122-23 (1996).
15 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE106.txt unknown Seq: 5 21-NOV-06 13:48
2006] Police Liability Under State Tort Law 329
1800s, such conduct was informally tolerated well into the twenti-
eth century.16  Both law enforcement and court systems viewed
domestic violence as existing within the private sphere and, thus,
outside the law’s reach.17
In the 1970s, this notion of the private domestic sphere shaped
the policies of local police departments regarding their responses
to reports of domestic abuse.  Police commonly responded to
these low-priority calls by telling the victim that there was noth-
ing they could do or by instructing the batterer to take a walk to
“cool off.”18  With police explicitly instructed to avoid arrest and
prosecutors dismissing the few cases in which arrests were made,
the criminal law was virtually useless to a domestic violence vic-
tim.19  Furthermore, there were no effective civil remedies avail-
able to battered women, except in limited cases as part of a
divorce proceeding.20
In response to the tireless efforts of battered women’s advo-
cates in the mid to late 1970s, state legislatures began to enact
civil protection order statutes to protect victims of domestic vio-
lence against their abusers.21  All fifty states had enacted domes-
tic violence civil protection-order legislation by 1994.22  These
statutes provide victims of domestic violence with a comprehen-
sive remedy to prevent future violence.23  Depending on the ju-
risdiction, relief may include prohibiting the abuser from
contacting the victim, awarding temporary child custody to the
victim, ordering the abuser to vacate the residence in which he
and the victim reside, requiring the abuser to seek counseling, or
some combination of the above.24  Protection orders are rela-
tively easy to obtain and they normally require only the prepon-
derance of the evidence burden of proof.25  The protection of a
temporary order is quickly available by participation in an ex
parte proceeding and is effective until a hearing on the issuance
16 Sack, supra  note 10, at 1661-62. R
17 Id.  at 1662.
18 Id.
19 See id.  at 1662-65.
20 Id.  at 1665.
21 Id.  at 1667.
22 Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage:
A Call for Reform , 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 100 (2005).
23 See id.  at 121 (providing an illustrative list of remedies).
24 Id.  at 100.
25 Id.  at 101.
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of a permanent order.26  In nearly every state, the violation of a
civil protection order is at least a misdemeanor, and in most
states, one who violates an order can be held in civil or criminal
contempt as well.27
The next section describes Oregon’s civil protection order stat-
utory scheme to illustrate how these statutes work.  To under-
stand Oregon’s approach to municipal police liability for failure
to enforce protection orders, which is discussed in Part III.B of
this Comment, a description of Oregon’s Family Abuse Protec-
tion Act is essential.
B. Civil Protection Orders in Oregon
In 1977, Oregon enacted the Family Abuse Prevention Act
(FAPA).28  A FAPA order allows a person who was a victim of
domestic abuse within the preceding six months to obtain a re-
straining order against further abuse without having to file for
divorce or legal separation.29  This statute, like many other state
civil protection-order statutes, requires an Oregon victim to
prove a danger of future abuse by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.30  “Abuse” is defined as attempting to cause or actually
causing bodily injury, placing another in fear of imminent bodily
injury, or forcing, overtly or by threat, another to engage in sex-
ual relations.31  A FAPA restraining order is available only
against a family or household member,32 and the victim and
abuser must both be eighteen or older, with few exceptions.33
Under FAPA, if the judge at an ex parte hearing finds that
26 Id.  at 119.
27 Id.  at 101.  In some states, repeat violations of civil protection orders can be
charged as a felony subjected to both fines and possible jail time. Id.
28 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.700-107.732 (2003).
29 Id. § 107.710(1), (3).  To do so, the victim must file a petition with the circuit
court alleging that she or he is in imminent danger of further abuse. Id.
§ 107.710(1).  The six-month requirement is waived if the abuser lives more than 100
miles from the victim or if the abuser has been in jail or prison during the preceding
six-month period. Id. § 107.710(6).
30 Id. § 107.710(2).
31 Id. § 107.705(1).
32 Id.  “Family or household members” are defined as the victim’s spouse; former
spouse; adults related to the victim by blood, marriage, or adoption; persons
cohabitating or who have cohabitated with the victim; persons who have been in-
volved in a sexually intimate relationship with the victim within the preceding two
years; or the unmarried parent of the victim’s child. Id.
33 See id. § 107.726 (listing exceptions that apply when the minor is the spouse or
former spouse of the respondent or a person who has been sexually intimate with
the respondent if that respondent is over the age of eighteen).
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there exists imminent danger to the victim’s safety, the judge
must issue a temporary protection order.34  This order may in-
clude an award of temporary custody of minor children to the
victim.35  At the request of the petitioner, the judge must order
the abuser to leave the couple’s mutual residence, refrain from
contacting the petitioner, remain a certain distance from the vic-
tim, refrain from bothering the victim in any way, or any combi-
nation of the above.36  The respondent then receives notice that
he may request a hearing within twenty-one days if he wishes to
contest the order or any of its provisions.37  If a permanent order
is issued, it is effective for up to one year.38  A police officer re-
sponding to a call about a FAPA order violation must arrest the
batterer if there is probable cause to do so.39
Civil protection order systems, both nationally and in Oregon,
depend on police departments to enforce their provisions.  The
following section shows that most abusers obey the civil protec-
tion orders against them.40  The incentive to obey is clearly re-
lated to the likelihood of police enforcement.  In this way,
enforcement is vital to ensuring an order’s actual and perceived
efficacy.
C. Use and Efficacy of Civil Protection Orders
Domestic violence primarily affects women.  According to a
report published by the U.S. Department of Justice, 85% (or
588,490) of the 671,790 nonfatal intimate-partner victimizations
reported in 2001 involved female victims.41  This report also re-
34 Id. § 107.718(1).
35 In 2005, the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 424, which gives courts dis-
cretion in awarding temporary custody of minor children to a restraining order peti-
tioner.  All other forms of relief, if requested, must be awarded once a preliminary
finding of danger has been made.  S.B. 424, 73rd Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or.
2005).
36 § 107.718.  The above list is not exhaustive.  See § 107.718(1)(a)-(i) for a de-
tailed list of available remedies.
37 Id. § 107.716.
38 Id. § 107.718(3).  FAPA orders may be renewed beyond one year upon a find-
ing that a person in the petitioner’s situation would reasonably fear further abuse if
the order were not to be renewed. Id. § 107.725.
39 Id. § 133.310(3). See infra note 144 and accompanying text. R
40 See infra text accompanying notes 48-56.
41 CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIO-
LENCE 1, 1993-2001 (2003), available at  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.
pdf.  “Intimate partner violence” is defined in this study as nonfatal violent victim-
izations committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends of the
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vealed that a current or former intimate partner killed 33% of
female murder victims in that year, while only 4% of male mur-
der victims were killed by current or former intimate partners.42
Many incidents of intimate partner abuse, however, are never re-
ported to law enforcement.43  Of a conservatively estimated two
million women who are physically assaulted, stalked, or raped
each year by an intimate partner, only 20% seek protection or-
ders.44  The situation in Oregon appears even less optimistic.  Ac-
cording to a survey by the Oregon Department of Human
Services, an estimated one in ten Oregon women aged twenty to
fifty-five experienced intimate partner violence over a five-year
period.45  However, only 9,161 of the estimated 24,428 physical
domestic violence assaults committed by intimate partners within
the twelve months preceding this survey were reported to law
enforcement.46  Furthermore, only 23% of the victims in these
reported incidents actually sought FAPA restraining orders.47
This means that even fewer victims of intimate partner abuse
seek protection orders in Oregon than on average nationally.
If civil protection orders fail to stop abuse, they encourage a
false, and therefore dangerous, sense of security.  Studies have
shown, however, that protection orders help secure the safety of
domestic violence victims in two important ways:  they deter fu-
ture violence48 and prevent an escalation in the severity of future
violent incidents.49  Although earlier studies suggest otherwise,50
new research finds that civil protection orders decrease future
abuse by as much as 68%51 and keep victims safer over time.52
victims. Id. Violent acts considered include rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggra-
vated assault, and simple assault. Id.
42 Id.
43 One study estimates that in an average twelve-month period, as many as four
million women suffer a serious assault by an intimate partner.  AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY:  REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCI-
ATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 10 (1996).
44 Victoria L. Holt et al., Do Protective Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future
Partner Violence and Injury? , 24 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 16, 16 (2003).
45 OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN OREGON:
FINDINGS FROM THE OREGON WOMEN’S HEATH AND SAFETY SURVEY 6 (2004),
available at  http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/ipv/docs/survey.pdf.
46 Id.  at 17.
47 Id.
48 Smith, supra  note 22, at 123-24. R
49 Id.  at 123 & n.189.
50 Id.  at 124-26.
51 Id.  at 123.
52 Id.
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Several studies have also shown that civil protection orders have
a positive effect on the personal well-being of the victim.53  They
empower the victim with choice and control.54  Of the 285 par-
ticipants interviewed by telephone in a study conducted by the
National Institute of Justice, 72% initially said that their lives had
improved as a result of having obtained a protection order.55  In
follow-up interviews six months later, 85% of participants said
that their lives had improved, 90% reported feeling better about
themselves, and 80% felt safer.56
Although the percentage of battered women who choose to
obtain protection orders is small, it nonetheless represents a sig-
nificant number of women.  Perception of enforcement is neces-
sary to ensuring the safety of these women.  Enforcement also
likely influences the decisions of the women who do not choose
to report domestic abuse or obtain protection orders.  If a wo-
man is uncertain whether the police will respond appropriately to
a reported protection order violation, she may be reluctant to
seek the state’s protection.  For this same reason, it is also likely
that many victims are reluctant to place their lives in the hands of
a law enforcement system with ultimate discretion in deciding
whether or not to enforce.  As a result, accountability for failure
to enforce is essential to ensuring the efficacy of existing civil
protection orders.  It is equally essential to foster trust in the sys-
tem and, thus, encourage more victims to obtain this effective
form of protection from domestic abuse.
The following section discusses one route victims have taken to
demand accountability:  victims have claimed that police failure
to respond adequately to domestic violence incidents constitutes
a violation of their constitutional rights.
II
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE CONSTITUTION
Title 42, § 1983 of the United States Code  provides a federal
damages remedy to private individuals when the state has in-
fringed upon their constitutional rights.57  Domestic abuse vic-
53 Id.
54 Id.  at 120.
55 Damon Phillips, Civil Protection Orders:  Issues in Obtainment, Enforcement,
and Effectiveness , 61 J. MO. B. 29, 37 & nn.104-05 (2005); Smith, supra  note 22, at R
120 & nn.175-76.
56 Id.
57 Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, or-
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tims have attempted to bring claims under this statute by alleging
that police failure to protect them from domestic violence re-
quires constitutional redress on three separate bases:  equal pro-
tection, substantive due process, and procedural due process.  To
bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the
conduct was committed by an individual acting under the color of
state law, and (2) that such conduct infringed upon the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.58
A. Equal Protection:  Problems of Proof
Battered women have attempted to argue that a state’s inade-
quate response to domestic violence committed against them vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.59
Unlike race, for example, gender is not considered a “suspect
class” by the U.S. Supreme Court, which means that a gender-
based law does not trigger the Court’s most critical strict scrutiny
review.60  Instead, when a state seeks to defend a gender-based
law, it must only establish an exceedingly persuasive justification
for differentiating on that basis.61 In order to invoke this inter-
mediate scrutiny, however, the plaintiff must establish either that
the police department’s policy is gender-discriminatory on its
face or that the policy intentionally discriminates against women
as a class.62  Although the Court has never addressed an Equal
Protection Clause claim in the context of restraining order en-
forcement, decisions from the lower courts indicate that it would
be nearly impossible for such a claim to succeed.  Claims of une-
qual police protection under the Fourteenth Amendment are un-
dinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . .
shall be liable to the party injured . . . for redress . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
58 Id.
59 Compare Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that city police department’s policy of treating domestic violence incidents
as low priority did not violate equal protection where plaintiff could not show suffi-
cient discriminatory intent), with Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521,
1527-28, 1529 (D.C. Conn. 1984) (denying city’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s equal
protection claim where city’s practice of affording inadequate protection to women
complaining of domestic abuse operated as an administrative classification used to
implement the law in a discriminatory fashion on the basis of sex).  Since Torrington ,
no plaintiff has been able to establish sufficient discriminatory intent in claiming a
violation of equal protection for police failure to respond adequately to domestic
violence crime.
60 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
61 Id.
62 See  Juthani, supra  note 10, at 58. R
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likely to withstand the tremendous burden of establishing the
requisite intent to discriminate.  Even if discriminatory intent is
somehow shown, if the state proves an important government
objective to which the classification substantially relates, the
plaintiff loses.63
The 1988 case Hynson v. City of Chester  demonstrates the dif-
ficulties involved with using § 1983 to sue state police depart-
ments or officials under the Equal Protection Clause.64  In this
case, the plaintiff alleged that the state police department’s pol-
icy of ignoring domestic violence complaints violated the de-
ceased victim’s right to equal protection of the laws and that the
police failed to protect the deceased from her estranged boy-
friend who murdered her at her place of work.65
The Third Circuit considered whether a policy of treating do-
mestic violence differently than nondomestic violence crimes dis-
criminated against women on its face absent a showing of
discriminatory intent.66  The court noted what it perceived as “a
growing trend of plaintiffs relying upon the [D]ue [P]rocess and
[E]qual [P]rotection [C]lauses . . . to force police departments to
provide women with the protection from domestic violence that
police agencies are allegedly reluctant to give.”67  In response to
this trend, the court articulated a clear standard for other courts
to follow regarding equal protection claims of this kind.  This
new standard declared that in order for a plaintiff to survive sum-
mary judgment, she would have to show sufficient evidence from
which a jury could infer that the policy or custom in question was
enacted to provide less protection to domestic violence victims
than to other victims of violent crime, that a motivating factor in
adopting such a policy was discriminatory intent against women
as a class, and that the plaintiff was injured because of the policy
or custom.68  The court remanded the case back to the trial court
63 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33.
64 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988).
65 Id.  at 1027-28.  Although the victim in this case had obtained a temporary pro-
tection order, that order had expired by the time the victim called the police for
assistance. Id.  The legal standard articulated, however, applies to victims who
might bring suit under the Equal Protection Clause against police departments for
failure to enforce a valid protection order, as well as for failure to respond to reports
of domestic abuse absent the existence of any valid order or protection.
66 Id.  at 1027.
67 Id.  at 1030.
68 Id.  at 1032-33.
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to apply this test.69
Because domestic violence laws protect victims of both gen-
ders, police department policies that designate domestic violence
assaults as low priority are not facially discriminatory even
though these assaults primarily victimize women.  Furthermore,
it is extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prove that discriminatory
intent against women as a class was a motivating factor of the
police department in enacting the policy.  As Catharine MacKin-
non remarked in a debate concerning the defunct civil rights pro-
vision of the Violence Against Women Act, “[t]he definition of
intent . . . under the Fourteenth Amendment has made the Four-
teenth Amendment nearly worthless to women.  That is, if you
don’t think bad thoughts about women while doing bad things to
them, it doesn’t violate the Equal Protection Clause.”70
It is even more difficult to prove the necessary discriminatory
intent for an equal protection claim today.  An increased aware-
ness about domestic violence has developed since Hynson , and
local law enforcement domestic violence policies have changed,
at least on paper, to reflect this awareness.  It is no longer accept-
able to classify domestic violence crimes as low priority.  Many
states have even enacted mandatory arrest policies for domestic
violence incidents.  It would, therefore, be extremely difficult to
show discriminatory intent on the face of today’s domestic vio-
lence police policies, as they appear to place these incidents at
the top of the priority list.  While the lip service paid to prioritiz-
ing domestic violence is encouraging, this does not mean that the
policies are enforced.  It is clear from recent lawsuits against
state police departments, such as Castle Rock , that just because
the policy looks good does not mean the mindset of the individu-
als enforcing it has changed.  Nevertheless, in light of standards
like that set forth in Hynson , the equal protection route looks all
but closed off to women who wish to invoke its protection
against inadequate police response to domestic violence.71
69 Id.  at 1033.  Although the court found that the evidence proffered, surprisingly,
was sufficient to show discriminatory intent, it ruled against the plaintiff on the basis
that the officers possessed a qualified immunity from suit. See Hynson v. City of
Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (E.D. Pa. 1990).  It is, of course, unclear how the
lower court might have decided if this immunity was not available.
70 Charles Fried & Catharine MacKinnon, Arguing the Violence Against Women
Act:  Two Views  51:15-51:32 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harvard Law
Sch. webcast May 1, 2000), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/vaw/.
71 A recent case from the Ninth Circuit was remanded to allow consideration of
the equal protection question when the family of a wife slain by her estranged hus-
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B. Substantive Due Process:  No Duty to Protect
Women have also argued that police failure to protect them as
victims of domestic violence violates substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  For such a claim to succeed,
the victim must show that she was deprived of a liberty interest72
in that she was denied the right to affirmative police protection
for failure to arrest and enforce her restraining order.
This claim was effectively rejected in 1989 when the U.S. Su-
preme Court declared that the Due Process Clause did not re-
quire a state to protect its citizens against third party violence in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services .73
In DeShaney , local child protection services failed to protect
Joshua, a young boy, by failing to take him from his father’s cus-
tody after receiving numerous complaints of abuse and having
reason to believe that the abuse was occurring.74  His father’s
beatings eventually left the boy with permanent brain damage.75
The plaintiff brought a § 1983 action claiming that the state’s fail-
ure to protect the young boy constituted a violation of his liberty,
which is a substantive due process right under the Constitution.76
The Rehnquist majority rejected this claim.  The Court held
that the substantive due process clause did not require affirma-
tive, protective action by the state to ensure minimal levels of
safety and security to private individuals.77  Rather, the Court
said that substantive due process was merely a limitation on the
state’s power to affirmatively deprive an individual of safety and
security.78  As the Court noted, “[the Fourteenth Amendment’s]
purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure
that the State protected them from each other.”79
band was denied the chance to prove an equal protection violation at the trial court
level.  Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000).  Finally, in
June of 2002, six years after the murder/suicide, the county offered to settle the case
for one million dollars and the plaintiffs agreed.  Nancy K.D. Lemon, Sonoma
County, California, Sheriff’s Department Settles Domestic Violence Murder Case for
One Million Dollars , 8 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 1, 15 (2002).  Although this case
is encouraging, it is not indicative of future success in proving discriminatory intent
because it was settled.
72 Juthani, supra  note 10, at 58. R
73 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
74 Id.  at 191-93.
75 Id.  at 193.
76 Id.  at 191, 195.
77 Id.
78 Id.  at 195.
79 Id.  at 196.
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The Court’s reasoning contrasts directly with Robin West’s
view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s main purpose was to en-
sure that no state could deprive an individual of the protections
afforded by the civil and criminal law against private violence.80
The Court’s reasoning is also antithetical to Catharine MacKin-
non’s theory of a feminist state, in which she argues that the neg-
ative conception of liberty, which is the foundation of American
Constitutional Law and the principle behind the DeShaney  deci-
sion, makes it impossible for women to achieve equality within
the system.81  She reasons that:
If one group is socially granted the positive freedom to do
whatever it wants to another group, to determine that the sec-
ond group will be and do this rather than that, no amount of
negative freedom legally guaranteed to the second group will
make it the equal of the first.  For women, this has meant that
civil society, the domain in which women are distinctively sub-
ordinated and deprived of power, has been placed beyond
reach of legal guarantees.82
Within this framework, battered women have only the right to
be left alone—alone with their batterers.  They are denied the
positive liberty of protection from male violence.
Alternatively, the DeShaney  petitioners argued that even if the
Court found no duty to protect Joshua from the violence of his
father initially, a special relationship created between Joshua and
the state imposed upon the state a constitutional duty to protect
him.83  This special relationship, they argued, formed when the
state took temporary custody of Joshua.84  When the state failed
to discharge the duty to protect him after this point, the petition-
ers claimed, by returning him to the custody of his father, it de-
prived him of substantive due process.85  The majority rejected
this argument as well.86  While the Court acknowledged that the
state may have been aware of Joshua’s situation, it also noted
that the state did not create the danger, nor did it do anything to
make the situation worse by returning Joshua to his father’s
80 West, supra note 1, at 129. R
81 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
164-65 (1989).
82 Id.
83 DeShaney , 489 U.S. at 197.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.  at 198.
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care.87  The Court coldly reasoned that Joshua was in “no worse
position than that in which he would have been had [the state]
not acted at all.”88
The Court expressly declined to address, however, whether
Wisconsin’s child protection statutes created a constitutional en-
titlement to protection services under the procedural component
of the Due Process Clause.89  It was precisely this question of
procedural due process that the Court answered in May 2005.
C. Procedural Due Process:  The Last Constitutional Chance
Sixteen years after the DeShaney  decision, the Court ad-
dressed whether a state’s failure to protect might violate the pro-
cedural component of the Due Process Clause.  In Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales ,90 the Court held that Jessica Gonzales did not
have a property interest in police enforcement of her restraining
order.91  The shocking facts of this case make the Court’s rejec-
tion of this last chance for constitutional protection especially dif-
ficult to swallow.
The facts are, even by Justice Scalia’s standards, “horrible.”92
Jessica Gonzales obtained a temporary restraining order as part
of her divorce proceedings that commanded her estranged hus-
band not to “molest or disturb” the peace of her or her three
daughters.93  When made permanent on June 4, 1999, it was al-
tered to give the respondent ex-husband custody of their three
daughters on alternate weekends, two weeks during the summer,
and a prearranged, midweek dinner visit upon reasonable no-
tice.94  Late in the afternoon of June 22, eighteen days after the
issuance of this order, the three girls disappeared from Jessica’s
front lawn where they had been playing.95  Suspecting that her
husband had taken them, she called the police.96  The police re-
sponded, viewed the restraining order, and told Jessica there was
nothing they could do.97  She was instructed to call if her ex-hus-
87 Id.  at 201.
88 Id.
89 Id.  at 195 n.2.
90 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
91 Id.  at 2810.
92 Id.  at 2800.
93 Id.  at 2800-01.
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band and daughters did not return by 10 p.m.98  At 8:30 p.m.,
Jessica talked to her ex-husband and learned that he was with the
girls at an amusement park.99  She called the police again, and
they reiterated that she should call back at 10 p.m.100  She called
at 10 p.m., as instructed, and was told to call back at 12 a.m.101
She called at 12 a.m. and was told that an officer had been dis-
patched, yet no one arrived.102  She went to the police station
and filed an incident report around 1 a.m.103  An officer took the
report and went to dinner.104  At 3:20 a.m., Jessica’s ex-husband
arrived at the police station and was killed in a shoot-out with the
officers.105  The police found Jessica’s three girls in the cab of her
ex-husband’s truck, murdered.106
Jessica sued under § 1983 and claimed that the police’s blatant
refusal to enforce her restraining order violated her procedural
due process rights.107  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of Jessica’s claim and held
that she had a protected property interest in the enforcement of
her restraining order, denial of which constituted a violation of
her right to procedural due process.108  This court found that the
city had deprived her of this right when the police refused to seri-
ously consider her pleas for enforcement.109
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed; Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, gave no deference to the Tenth Circuit when he
reversed its decision.110  The majority opinion stated that the pro-
cedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect
everything that could be described as a benefit.111  The Court
held that there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement—some-
thing more than an abstract desire or a one-sided expectation.112
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2801-02.






107 Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d,
125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
108 Id.  at 1109.
109 Id.  at 1109-10.
110 Castle Rock , 125 S. Ct. at 2803.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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The key to whether an entitlement existed in this case, the Court
noted, was the written notice to law enforcement on the back of
Jessica’s restraining order, which described a police officer’s duty
to enforce that order.113
That notice stated that the law enforcement officer “shall use
every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order” and that
the officer “shall arrest . . . or . . . seek a warrant” when probable
cause exists that a violation has occurred.114  Despite the clarity
of this language, Scalia declared that “[a] well established tradi-
tion of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently
mandatory arrest statutes.”115  A statutory entitlement, he rea-
soned, would require a stronger indication that action was re-
quired than did the language contained in the notice.116  For the
U.S. Supreme Court, mandatory, very simply, did not mean
mandatory.  Jessica’s interest was held to stem from one part of a
greater statutory scheme, giving the option to either (1) arrest or
(2) make a reasonable effort to respond.117  According to the
Court, this choice of options was a clear indicator that the statute
invited police discretion.118  The Court also pointed out that the
statutory obligation to seek an arrest warrant was one of mere
procedure and therefore did not rise to the level of an entitle-
ment under due process.119
The Court noted, however, that even if an entitlement could be
found, it would not necessarily create a property interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.120  Enforcement of a re-
straining order, the majority reasoned, had no monetary value.121
Rather, the interest in enforcement arose only incidentally from
a function that states have always performed: that of arresting
wrongdoers.122  In a few brief pages, the U.S. Supreme Court
closed its doors to battered women and, thus, clearly declared
113 Id. at 2804-05.
114 Id.  at 2805 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a)-(b) (2004)).
115 Id.  at 2805-06 (emphasis added).
116 Id.  at 2806.
117 Id.  at 2807-08.
118 Id.  (“Such indeterminacy is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory.  Nor
can someone be safely deemed ‘entitled’ to something when the identity of the al-
leged entitlement is vague.”).
119 Id.  at 2808.
120 Id.  at 2809.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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that their interest in an adequate police response to violence had
no constitutional import.
In Castle Rock , Justice Scalia acknowledged what he viewed as
the Court’s reluctance to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a
“font of tort law.”123  The majority noted, however, that the
states were not rendered powerless by this decision to provide
victims of domestic violence with enforceable remedies.124  In-
stead, Scalia noted that the individual states were free to propose
enforceable remedies, as each saw fit, to promote enforcement of
restraining orders within their borders.125
There is clearly a distinct qualitative difference between a con-
stitutional remedy and the option of municipal liability under
state tort law.  The Court’s refusal to recognize a battered wo-
man’s right to enforcement as a constitutional right implies that
such an interest is inferior to other rights that receive constitu-
tional protection.  Domestic violence has been historically over-
looked and disregarded at both the federal and state levels,126
and the Court’s decision in Castle Rock  continues that trend.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to recognize a consti-
tutional right to enforcement, civil liability under state tort law is
the only tool left to give civil protection orders the teeth they
need to protect victims of domestic violence.  The following sec-
tions survey various state tort law approaches to municipal liabil-
ity in the context of police failure to enforce civil protection
orders.
III
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO ENFORCE
PROTECTION ORDERS
A. General Principles of Civil Liability for
State and Local Entities
While all states have waived their blanket common-law immu-
nity from tort liability, two basic protections for state and local
police departments remain.  These doctrines are hurdles that a
victim of domestic violence must overcome in order to hold a
state or local police department liable for failing to enforce her
123 Id.  at 2810 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
124 Id.
125 See id.  (“[T]he people of Colorado are free to craft such a system under state
law.”).
126 See supra  Part I.A.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE106.txt unknown Seq: 19 21-NOV-06 13:48
2006] Police Liability Under State Tort Law 343
order of protection.  The first is discretionary immunity, which
protects police departments from suits relating to decisions of de-
partmental policy.127  The second hurdle is the public duty doc-
trine, which provides that when a statute imposes a duty upon a
public entity to the public at large, rather than to a particular
class of individuals, this duty is not enforceable in tort (i.e., the
general police duty to protect the public from violent crime).128
This public duty has often been summarized as “a duty to all is a
duty to none.”129
As a result of these doctrines, state police departments are
usually not liable for failing to provide protection, even if that
failure is negligent.130  There are two exceptions to these doc-
trines.  First, a police department may be held liable for failing to
protect a specific person if the department has actively under-
taken to protect that individual and that person relies to his or
her detriment on that promise of protection.131  In cases stem-
ming from this exception, courts have held that a special relation-
ship forms between the individual and the government entity
that gives rise to liability if a police officer acts negligently.132
Second, where a statute imposes a duty or specific obligation to a
particular class, such as victims of domestic violence, some courts
have found that the state may be held liable for negligent per-
formance of that duty.133  Courts often combine both exceptions
in holding that the special relationship created by a protection
order imposes a specific statutory duty on police departments to
protect domestic violence victims by enforcing that order.134
For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that a
county police department could be held liable for failing to en-
force a restraining order where that restraining order, combined
with the statutory mandate, created a special duty to arrest if
127 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 720 (Hornbook Series, West 2000).
128 Id.  at 723.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 728-29.
131 Id. at 729; Phillips, supra  note 55, at 30. R
132 DOBBS, supra  note 127, at 729. R
133 Id.  at 724.
134 See, e.g. , Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1331 (Ill. 1995) (holding that
sheriff may be held liable if injured party establishes that she is a person in need of
protection); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 76-77 (N.Y. 1985) (hold-
ing that when police are made aware of a possible protection order violation, they
are obligated to respond); Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 144-45 (Or. 1983) (en
banc) (holding that individuals with protection orders may allege a police officer’s
failure to perform a specific duty).
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probable cause was found.135  This court held that the officers
were not entitled to discretionary immunity from suit because
their lack of action was operational and unrelated to decisions of
policy.136  The court also said that the public duty doctrine did
not immunize the department because the state affirmatively un-
dertook to protect the petitioner when it issued the order and she
relied, to her detriment, on that protection.137
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court in Campbell v.
Campbell held that a police officer had no discretion as to
whether to arrest when there was probable cause to believe that
a protection order had been violated.138  The court held that the
police officers’ duties were ministerial and that discretionary im-
munity only applied to policy or planning decisions made at the
highest levels of government.139
New York has also employed the special relationship doctrine
to impose liability where the police are aware of a possible viola-
tion of a restraining order and fail to respond and investigate.140
While the New York Court of Appeals said that the existence of
a protection order itself was not enough to create a special rela-
tionship, it allowed the order to be considered as evidence that a
special relationship existed.141  The court held that when police
are made aware of a possible violation and fail to respond appro-
priately or investigate, they are liable for the consequences of
their negligence.142
While these approaches are commendable and provide useful
guidance, Oregon’s approach implies a duty directly from the
FAPA statute, which is an easily administered and more simpli-
fied solution that holds police accountable for their failure to
comply with FAPA’s mandatory arrest provisions.  The following
section discusses this approach.
B. Oregon Law and the Statutory Duty to Enforce:
Nearing v. Weaver
Under Oregon law, a restraining order imposes a specific stat-
135 Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tenn. 1999).
136 Id.  at 164.
137 Id.  at 164-65.
138 682 A.2d 272, 276-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
139 Id.  at 274.
140 Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985).
141 Id.  at 76.
142 Id.
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utory duty on police to protect victims of domestic violence.  In
1983, the Oregon Supreme Court held that state and local police
departments are liable for failing to enforce domestic violence
restraining orders in Nearing v. Weaver .143  The court held that
the following statute imposed a mandatory duty to arrest:
A peace officer shall arrest and take into custody a person
without a warrant when the peace officer has probable cause
to believe that:  (a) [t]here exists an order issued . . . re-
straining the person; and (b) [a] true copy of the order and
proof of service on the person has been filed . . . ; and (c) [t]he
peace officer has probable case to believe that the person to
be arrested has violated the terms of that order.144
In Nearing , police failed to arrest Henrietta Nearing’s es-
tranged husband for violating the restraining order because the
officer did not see him on her premises.145  This estranged hus-
band sought entry to Henrietta’s home three more times.146
During the last of these three incidents, he assaulted Henrietta’s
friend and damaged his van.147  In response to the report of this
incident, the police department told Henrietta that they would
arrest her estranged husband but never did.148  Two days later,
her estranged husband called and threatened to kill Henrietta’s
friend.149  The final incident prior to Henrietta’s suit involved her
estranged husband stopping her and her friend in front of her
home, threatening again to kill her friend, and then assaulting
him.150
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
143 670 P.2d 137, 140 (Or. 1983) (en banc).  The Oregon Supreme Court has also
abolished the public duty doctrine.  Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 725 n.4
(Or. 1979) (en banc).
144 Nearing , 670 P.2d at 139 n.1 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1979)
(amended 1981)).  A companion section mandates arrest at the scene of a domestic
dispute when the officer has probable cause to believe that one person has assaulted
another or placed another in imminent fear of serious physical injury. OR. REV.
STAT. § 133.055(2)(a) (2005).  This statutory language is an interesting contrast to
the language found to be nonmandatory in the Castle Rock  decision.  While the
Colorado statute at issue in the Castle Rock  case used the word “shall,” it also in-
cluded an instruction to use every reasonable means to make an arrest.  Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2801 (2005).  This appears to be an even
clearer mandate than that of the Oregon statute interpreted in Nearing .
145 Nearing,  670 P.2d at 139.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.  at 139-140.
149 Id.  at 140.
150 Id.
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lower appellate court that had affirmed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the city and its police officers.151  The court
held that victims of abuse may recover for both physical and
emotional injuries that result from a police officer’s failure to
comply with Oregon’s mandatory arrest statute.152  The court
held that the statutory language imposed a duty to protect a spe-
cific class of people:  victims of domestic abuse.153  The court
ruled that the very purpose of section 133.310(3) of the Oregon
Revised Statutes was to negate any discretion in enforcing FAPA
orders; therefore, the officers had no discretion in deciding
whether or not to arrest.154  In effect, the Oregon Supreme Court
ruled that a police failure to respond once probable cause has
been shown entails strict liability under the mandatory arrest
statute.
With the Oregon approach in mind, the final section of this
Comment advocates a national solution to the accountability
problem.  This solution calls for other states to adopt the Oregon
approach by implying a statutory duty to enforce in the short
term.  In the long term, it argues that victim advocates should
press for the explicit codification of a strict liability cause of ac-
tion within state civil protection order statutory schemes in order
to enable victims of domestic violence to hold police departments
liable for failing to enforce their protection orders.
IV
THE SOLUTION:  CODIFYING A CAUSE OF ACTION
Accountability for failure to enforce is essential to ensuring
the effectiveness of protection orders.  When the police fail to
pursue or refuse to address protection order violations, women
die.  Inadequate enforcement also encourages a false sense of se-
curity.  When victims rely on the police to enforce these orders
and that enforcement is sporadic or nonexistent, orders may per-
151 Id.  at 145.
152 Id.
153 Id.  at 143 (“The statutes in this case . . . are unique among statutory arrest
provisions because the legislature chose mandatory arrest as the best means to re-
duce recurring domestic violence.  They identify with precision when, to whom, and
under what circumstances police protection must be afforded.  The legislative pur-
pose in requiring the police to enforce individual restraining orders clearly is to pro-
tect the named persons for whose protection the order is issued, not to protect the
community at large by general law enforcement activity.”).
154 Id.  at 142.  The court also noted that factual and legal defenses were still avail-
able to the department and its officers. Id.  at 141-42.
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petuate future abuse.  They may do so by provoking the batterer
when the victim calls the police or attempts to leave the relation-
ship, relying on the order to protect her, and no assistance mate-
rializes.  Nonenforcement of protection orders may also
perpetuate further abuse by encouraging the batterer to not take
the order seriously.  Furthermore, consistent enforcement is es-
sential to foster trust in the system.  Such trust would result in
more victims obtaining this effective form of protection from do-
mestic abuse.
In the short term, police departments need to be held account-
able for failure to provide adequate protection to the holders of
civil protection orders.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to
recognize a constitutional right to have one’s protection order
enforced, it is vitally important that state tort law be made availa-
ble to victims.  While many states have adopted mandatory arrest
policies for violations of protection orders, some still have not.155
This is the obvious first step.156  For the majority of states that
have adopted mandatory statutory schemes, courts should look
to Oregon’s approach and imply a statutory duty to enforce by
concluding, as the Oregon courts did, that the legislature in-
tended an implied statutory tort.  This immediate solution re-
quires no further legislative action and allows victims to hold law
155 See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:  Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Vio-
lence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement , 42 HOUS. L.
REV. 237, 239 n.2 (2005).
156 Mandatory arrest for domestic violence is an extremely contentious issue.
Compare  Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in Do-
mestic Violence Prosecutions , 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1879-80 (1996) (arguing that
the societal benefits gained from mandatory arrest for domestic violence crimes far
outweigh any short-term costs to women’s autonomy and collective safety), with
Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Be-
tween Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence ,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 439-41 (2003) (claiming that mandatory
arrests have failed to take into account differences among races and cultures), and
Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly:  Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Interven-
tion , 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 565-69 (1999) (proposing a clinical approach as an
empowering alternative to mandatory interventions).  See generally Miccio, supra
note 155, at 241-42, for a discussion on the current discourse regarding mandatory R
arrest as an ideological divide between protagonists, who view such policies as nec-
essary because battered women are incapable of making rational choices, and antag-
onists, who view such policies as an unnecessary and often racist and sexist
regulation of women’s lives.  Such policies are essential, however, to deal with this
overwhelmingly gendered violence.  Due to the systemic nature of this problem, this
Comment proposes that the most effective mandatory arrest laws contain no-drop
provisions, which bar the victim from stopping the prosecution from moving
forward.
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enforcement accountable for failing to provide the protection it
promised by issuing the order without having to prove negligence
or physical injury.
States should take this solution one step further, however, and
codify a specific cause of action for failure to arrest when there is
probable cause to do so.  Enacting an express statutory tort cause
of action as part of its state protection order legislation would
provide victims with a more certain and, therefore, more power-
ful tool.  Such codification would also send a clear message to law
enforcement that domestic abuse will not be tolerated and re-
straining orders must be enforced against abusers consistently.
This statutory tort action should specifically define the duty to
be analyzed:  the duty of police departments to respond ade-
quately to reported violations of civil protection orders.  Breach
of this duty should be defined by an illustrative, but not exhaus-
tive, list of qualifying actions:  e.g., duty to investigate a reported
violation, duty to arrest at the scene when there is probable cause
to believe that a violation has occurred, and duty to provide re-
quested protection such as a police escort to a location away
from the scene.157  The statutory standard of care would preempt
the reasonable person standard when a police department
breaches these specifically illustrated duties and hold police de-
partments strictly liable in these specific and limited cases de-
fined by the statute.158  The victim would bear the burden of
proving, of course, that a violation occurred, that the police de-
partment caused the violation, and that there are resulting dam-
ages.  The statute should allow a plaintiff to recover attorney’s
fees and all court costs in addition to actual and emotional dam-
ages, including purely emotional harm.
For negligent breaches not specifically defined in the proposed
statute that might arise, normal negligence law should remain
open to victims as a remedy.  Police action or inaction should be
measured by how a reasonable police officer responding to a do-
mestic abuse assault would respond.  It is important to define the
standard of care in this way because domestic abuse assaults pose
157 Particular cases might present unique sets of facts that constitute a police de-
partment’s breach of duty.  An illustrative list does not preclude such claims.  These
claims are simply subjected to the normal negligence analysis, rather than strict lia-
bility under the proposed statute.
158 It is important to remember that police departments will still have the oppor-
tunity to prove that a violation has not actually occurred by a showing of good faith
investigation, etc.
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unique risks to victims.  These crimes require action above and
beyond that typically taken in response to stranger assaults.  Like
any other negligence case, when dealing with actions or inactions
not specifically defined in the statute, the plaintiff would have to
show that her injury was actually caused by the police depart-
ment’s failure to respond and also that the injury was
foreseeable.
CONCLUSION
Catharine MacKinnon and many other feminist scholars have
recognized that the negative conception of rights operating in the
United States does very little to provide a majority of its popula-
tion with the tools they need to live freely and equally to men in
modern society.159  We respect the right to be let alone yet ignore
the right of each and every woman abused by an intimate partner
to have access to at least the same protection the law provides
against other violent assaults.  In the wake of Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales  and the effective denial of all constitutional
options, the time to provide victims access to tort remedy is now.
159 E.g., MACKINNON, supra  note 81 and accompanying text. R
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